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THE DATA SURVEILLANCE STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE
Joel R. Reidenberg*

INTRODUCTION

Europe and the United States recognize privacy as a
fundamental pillar of democracy. The U.S. Constitution enshrines
protection against state intrusions,1 and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Charter") as well as
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") each mandate that law and
public authorities not interfere with "private life." 2 Over the last
decade, however, law in Europe and the United States has
progressively strengthened the ability of public authorities to obtain
communications data at the expense of privacy. The justification for
these incursions is often framed in terms of liberty and freedom,
namely that public safety is a condition of liberty and freedom and
that the protection of public safety necessitates the narrowing of
privacy protections.
This Essay will focus on communications data-namely the
transactional and geolocation information associated with network
interactions. The thesis is that government data surveillance law in
Europe and the United States has reached a turning point for the
future of information privacy online. The democracies on both sides
of the Atlantic are trying to balance the legitimate needs of public
authorities to access online transactional data with the basic rights

* Microsoft Visiting Professor of Information Technology Policy,
Princeton University; Stanley D. and Nikki Waxberg Chair and Professor of
Law, Fordham University School of Law. This Essay began as the 6th Annual
Berkeley Privacy Law Lecture. I am grateful to and would like to thank Axel
Arnbak, Anu Bradford, Robert Gellman, Angus Johnston, Christopher Millard,
Paul Schwartz, Stephen Wm.Smith, Alexander Tsesis, Kurt Wimmer and the
participants at the Berkeley Lecture, the Princeton CITP Luncheon Series, and
the Wake Forest Law Review Symposium for their comments.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 6-8, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter]; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR].
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of citizens to be free from state intrusions on their privacy.
Europe, for example, the European Commission notes that

In

[l]aw enforcement authorities in most EU States have reported
that retained data play a central role in their criminal
investigations. These data have provided valuable leads and
evidence that have resulted in convictions for criminal offences
and in acquittals of innocent suspects in relation to crimes
which, without an obligation to retain these data, might never
have been solved. 3
But, as illustrated by the U.S. government's massive collection of
telecommunications data; 4 by the UK tapping of transatlantic
telecommunications cables; 5 by the Swedish government's
warrantless wiretap authority;6 and by the wiretapping of
journalists in France, 7 democratic societies have created a
technological
infrastructure of surveillance with a legal
infrastructure of surveillance authorizations. In effect, the legal
framework that each system has established will not be able to
preserve, over the long term, citizen privacy and basic democratic
values.
This Essay starts with a short overview of the basic rules for
data retention and access on both sides of the Atlantic, including the
special privileges accorded to national security claims. The rules
lead to an assessment of the key intractable problems for citizen
privacy of proportionality requirements, the privatization of state
surveillance activity, and security oversight. The Essay next looks
at how the reliance on proportionality and private actors
fundamentally undermines the preservation of online privacy. The

3. See What We Do: Data Retention, EUR. COMMISSION HOME AFFAIRS,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation
/data-retentionindexen.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
4. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Broader Sifting of Message Data by N.S.A. Is
Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013, at Al.
5. Tony Patterson, Germany Prepares to Charge UK and US Intelligence
over
Fresh Bugging
Allegations,
INDEP.
(June
30,
2013),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-prepares-to-chargeuk-and-us-intelhgence-over-fresh-bugging-allegations-8680249.html.
6. Sweden Approves Wiretapping Law, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7463333.stm.
7. Samuel Laurent, Ecoutes de l'Elysie: du dementi a l'aveu [Elysde
Wiretapping: From Denial to Confession], LE MONDE (last updated Jan. 31,
2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/201 1/09/01/ecoutes-de-l-elysee-dufantasme-a-l-aveu_1566117_823448.html;
see also Jacques Follorou &
Johannes Franck, Rgvglations sur le Big Brother frangais [Disclosures of the
French Big Brother], LE MONDE (last updated July 7, 2013),
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/07/04/revelations-sur-le-big-brotherfrancais_3441973_3224.html (reporting on the sharing of metadata within the
French intelligence agencies).
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Essay concludes with three proposals to revive privacy as necessary
in democracy: (1) strengthening explicit limits on collection and
storage of information with strict and specific limits on access, (2)
establishing transparency of data access, and (3) establishing
transparency of public security access combined with penalties for
accountability.
I. BASIC RULES
The United States and European approaches to data retention
and access reflect important systemic differences between legal
systems on the two continents. United States law is essentially
silent on data retention but regulates access to data held in the
private sector by public authorities.8 This tracks the United States
legal system's implementation of privacy rights that restrain state
power and focus on individualistic freedoms. 9 By contrast, Europe
extensively regulates the collection and retention of data by the
private sector and focuses less on access restraints by public
authorities. Europe's approach implements privacy rights through a
governance model that looks to state power as the protector of
citizens and emphasizes the regulation of all aspects of data
processing. 10 Incongruously, at the same time, European data
protection focuses less attention on the means of access by public
authorities."
A.

Retention

United States law does not impose a general data retention
The only exception is in the context of
requirement.
Through a narrowly defined
billing.
telecommunications
telecommunications regulation, U.S. law mandates that telephone
toll records be retained for at least eighteen months in order for
consumers to be able to dispute bills. 12 There is no requirement for
deletion at the end of that time.
Communications service providers in the United States,
however, have increasing incentives to retain traffic and location

8. Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1345 (2000).
9. See id. at 1344-49.
10. Id. at 1349-54.
11. Member-state constitutional regimes and the ECHR, as higher law,
may however contain checks on state access to privately held data.
12. See 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2012) (stating that carriers that offer or bill toll
telephone service "shall retain for a period of 18 months such records as are
necessary to provide the following billing information about telephone toll calls:
the name, address, and telephone number of the caller, telephone number
called, date, time and length of the call").
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data for data mining programs and for commercial revenue. 13 The
most popular websites routinely collect and retain users' traffic data
for commercial purposes. 14
Service providers typically retain
communications data for long periods of time. 15 Yahoo, for example,
stores Yahoo group activity log information for as long as a group is
active-in other words, for a potentially unlimited time period. 16
Europe, by contrast, has a complex set of rules applicable to
data retention. The basic framework set out in Directive 95/46/EC
that entered into force in 1995 (the "Data Protection Directive")
prohibits the storage of data beyond the duration required to fulfill
the purposes of data collection. 17 The obligations apply to all data
processing and are not limited to any particular sector. As a
framework approach, the Data Protection Directive does not provide
any specific guidance for transaction and geolocation information.
Seven years later, the European Union adopted Directive
2002/58/EC (the "E-Privacy Directive") to apply the general
principles of the Data Protection Directive to the "electronic
communications" sector.' 8 The E-Privacy Directive provides that
"traffic data relating to subscribers and users ... must be erased or

made anonymous when it is no longer needed for the purpose of the
transmission of a communication," 19 but can be retained for certain

13. See 4syth.com, For Big Data Analytics There's No Such Thing as Too
Big, FORSYTH COMMS. (Mar. 2012), http://www.cisco.com/enIUS/solutions
/ns340/ns5l7/ns224Ibig-datawp.pdf.

14. See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 3 (August 10,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1446862
(reporting that 50% of popular websites use clandestine flash cookies to track
users).
15. See, e.g., Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response-Cell Phone
Company Data Retention Chart, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cell-phonelocation-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (chart produced by the U.S. Department of Justice
and released to the ACLU in response to a document request).
16. See Compliance Guide for Law Enforcement, YAHOO! 5,
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/socialnetwork/YahooSNLEG-

DOJ.pdf.
17. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, art.
6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
18. The European Community and Parliament adopted another directive in
1997 that applied the Data ProtectionDirective to the telecommunications
sector. See Directive 97/66/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 024 30) 1 (EC) (concerning the processing of personal data
and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector). This 1997
directive, however, did not address the data retention issue. See generally
Christopher
Millard,
Communications Privacy, in
IAN WALDEN,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND REGULATION 605 (4th ed. 2012).
19. Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
art. 6(1), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter E-Privacy Directive].
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limited marketing purposes. 20 Traffic data can also be stored "for
purposes of subscriber billing and interconnection payments" only so
long as the bill may be challenged or payment pursued. 21 In all, the
directives create a model that limits the duration and scope of data
retention.
At the time of adoption, though, neither the Data Protection
22
Directive nor the E-Privacy Directive applied to law enforcement.
23
This exclusion was necessary because the Maastricht Treaty, then
in force, did not provide for European Community competence in
matters of criminal law and procedure. 24 Because of different rules
among the member states relating to data retention for
investigation, detection, and prosecution of crime, the European
Union adopted Directive 2006/24/EC (the "Data Retention
Directive") to apply to traffic and location data in order for it to be
available to law enforcement. 25 The retention obligation applies to
providers of publicly available electronic communications services
and to providers of public communications networks, 26 and the
period of retention may be no less than six months and no longer
than twenty-four months.27 This durational requirement derogates
from the limits that would otherwise be imposed by the E-Privacy
Directive and the Data Protection Directive.
More recently, the Proposed European Union Data Protection
Regulation 28 creates uncertainty for the application of the Data
Retention Directive. The proposed regulation seeks to create a
"Right to be Forgotten" that seems to give individuals the power to
override data retention and require the purging of personal
information. 29 Article 17(3)(d), however, could create an exception
for compliance with a legal obligation to retain the personal
data by Union or Member State law to which the controller is
subject; Member State laws shall meet an objective of public
interest, respect the essence of the right to the protection of
20. Id. art. 6(3).
21. Id. art. 6(2).
22. Data Protection Directive, supra note 17, art. 3(2); E-Privacy Directive,
supranote 19, art. 1(3).
23. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191)
24. Id.
25. Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC) [hereinafter Data Retention Directive]. By its
terms, Directive 2006/24/EC does not apply to content information.
26. Id. art. 3(1).
27. Id. art. 6.
28. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
PersonalData and on the FreeMovement of Such Data (General Data Protection
Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter PDPR].
29. Id. art. 17.
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personal data and be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. 30
This would seem to allow data retention as a 'legitimate aim" for
law enforcement purposes notwithstanding the Right to be
Forgotten.
B.

Access

In contrast to the freedom for service providers to make
decisions about retention, the U.S. legal tradition focuses its
protection of citizens against the use of state power and regulates
government access to data. At the constitutional level, the Supreme
Court interprets the Fourth Amendment protection against
warrantless searches and seizures to protect a "reasonable
expectation of privacy," and has ruled that access to the contents of
a telephone call required a warrant issued for probable cause. 31 The
constitutional restriction on access does not, however, extend to
information provided to a third party because the Supreme Court
has also ruled that there is no 'legitimate 'expectation of privacy"' in
such information. 32 Since online traffic data are generated and
maintained by third parties, the Supreme Court's third party
doctrine means that public authorities will likely not face
33
constitutional limits on data access.
Technological advances, however, blur the distinction between
the constitutional protection afforded to contents, but not to traffic
data. The Supreme Court recognizes that there is a slippery slope
between the information conveyed by discrete transactional data
and by aggregations of transactional data. The aggregation of
transactional data in the context of data processing can readily
resemble contents.
In United States Department of Justice v.
Reporters' Committee,34 the Supreme Court noted specifically that
an aggregation of information otherwise publicly available-rap
sheet data-was qualitatively different from the individual records
themselves. 35
While the Reporters' Committee case addressed
information disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, the
qualitative significance of data aggregation is relevant to the Fourth

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. art. 17(3)(d).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1967).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1402-03 (2004); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of
Communications Privacy, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3-4 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-PartyDoctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009); Paul Ohm,
The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309, 1311
(2012).
34. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
35. Id. at 764-65.
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Amendment analysis. Recently, in United States v. Jones,36 the
Supreme Court began to question the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment's third-party doctrine to aggregations of geolocation
data.37 While the Supreme Court held in the Jones case that the
placement of a geolocation device on a suspect's car required a
warrant based on the physical placement of a device on private
property, 38 five justices in their concurrences indicated that the
aggregation of data reflecting movements39 on the public street might
constitute a cognizable privacy violation.
Although the lack of constitutional standards for access to data
appears in flux in the wake of United States v. Jones, Congress has
sought to carefully limit access by public authorities to online data.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 40 and the Stored
Communications Act 41 each impose basic restraints on public

authorities' access to information. 42 These statutes force public
authorities to obtain warrants and subpoenas for access to online
data. 43 The threshold, whether access requires a warrant based on
probable cause, a court order based on "specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe... [the
information is] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation," 44 or an administrative subpoena, depends on the type
of information sought and the duration of storage. 45 In an extensive
study of law enforcement data access rights, Professor Murphy has
noted that a plethora of statutory provisions permit law enforcement
36. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
37. Id. at 954, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 949 (majority opinion) ("The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.").
39. Id. at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that "I would ask
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less
at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on," and
writing that "[mlore fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties"); id. at 961 (Alito, Breyer,
Ginsberg & Kagan, JJ., concurring) ("[T]he Court's reasoning largely disregards
what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term
tracking) ....). For an interesting discussion of the "mosaic theory" that
articulates a rationale to protect aggregations, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the FourthAmendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).
41. Id. §§ 2701-2712.
42. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored
CommunicationsAct, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1208 (2004) (explaining the Stored Communications Act's applicability
to online activity).
43. Id. at 1218-20, 1222-23.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

45. Id. § 2703(a).
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access to privately held data, that the typical mechanism is a
judicial subpoena rather than a warrant, and that the subpoenas,
while easy to obtain, may be conditioned on prior notice or higher
46
evidentiary standards.
In Europe, the primary regulation of data access by public
authorities does not come from the European directives. The Data
Protection Directive prohibits disclosure of data for secondary
purposes and limits access to legitimate purposes. 47 The provisions
are, however, not applicable to law enforcement activity as such
activity was within the exclusive legal authority of the member
states. 48 Today, under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has
shared competence with the member states for matters involving
49
freedom, security, and justice.
The E-Privacy Directive conditions access by public authorities
on the adoption of a law that "constitutes a necessary, appropriate
and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard
national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and
the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal
offences." 50 This leaves the articulation of access rules to Member
State criminal procedure law. Member state criminal law varies on
the mechanisms and means of access to data held by third parties. 51
Similarly, the Data Retention Directive expressly allows public
authorities access to retained data "in specific cases and in
accordance with national law."52

The European Court of Justice

explicitly recognized that the Data Retention Directive in itself does

46. See Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice
System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 516-18 (2013).
47. Data Protection Directive, supra note 17, art. 6(1)(b).
48. Id. art. 3(2).
49. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306)
1. The PDPR can, thus, also set access standards that would be applicable to
public authorities pursuing data in the context of criminal investigations and
public safety. Id.
50. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 19, art. 15(1).
51. See, e.g., Winston Maxwell & Christopher Wolf, A Hogan Lovells White
Paperon a Global Reality: Governmental Access to Data in the Cloud, at 1 (July
18, 2012), available at http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/News/c6edcle2-d57b402e-9cab-a7be4e004c59/Presentation/NewsAttachment/al 7af284-7d04-4008b557-5888433b292d/Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%2OCloud
%20Data%2OPaper%20%2818%2OJuly%2012%29.pdf; Lorenzo Picotti & Ivan
Salvadori, Council of Europe Project on Cybercrime, National Legislation
Implementing the Convention on Cybercrime - ComparativeAnalysis and Good
Practices, 51-58 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.coe.int
/t/dghl/cooperationleconomiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Reports-Presentations
/567%20study2-d-version8%20_28%20august%2008.pdf.
52. Data Retention Directive, supra note 25, art. 4.
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"not... involve intervention by the police or law-enforcement
authorities." 53 Access rules must be established in member state
criminal law like those under the E-Privacy Directive. The Data
Retention Directive provides only limited guidance for those
They must have "procedures to be followed
national laws.
and... conditions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to retained
and
proportionality
necessity
with
in
accordance
data
requirements . .. [that are] subject to the relevant provisions of
European Union law or public international law, and in particular
54
the ECHR."
The national rules on data access, though, are subject to
important European treaty protections for citizens. The ECHR
constrains access by public authorities. 55 Article 8 of the ECHR
provides a "right to respect for his private and family life" and
provides that there should be "no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime."56 Similarly, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establishes a
"right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her," but
allows processing (which would include access) on the basis of a
"legitimate basis laid down by law." 57 Unlike the United States'
constitutional position, the ECHR and Charter apply protection to
58
both content and transaction data.
C.

National Security Privilege

The recent public revelations regarding the massive collection of
telecommunications data by the U.S. government reflect the
deviations and special legal rules for the national security context. 59

53. Case C-301/06, Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the
82,
available at
1-593,
E.C.R.
Union,
2009
European
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsftext=&docid=72843&pageln
dex=O&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=l&cid=239948.
54. Id. 12 (quoting Data Retention Directive, supra note 25, art. 4).
55. ECHR, supranote 2.
56. Id.
57. Charter, supra note 2, art. 8.
58. Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at § 84 (1984)
(noting that ECHR article 8 applies to caller ID information and not just
contents). The Charter applies to all personal data. Id.
59. See Preliminary Order, In re Application of the FBI, FISC Docket No.
13-80 (Apr. 25, 2013) (revealing metadata collection from Verizon by the FBI
under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)); see also Memorandum Opinion, FISC Docket
No. [classified] (Oct. 3, 2011), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default
(revealing
/files/filenode/fiscopinion_-_unconstitutionalsurveillanceO.pdf
collection of Internet communications data by the NSA under 50 U.S.C. § 1881).
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The practices disclosed in these leaks are not new. During the
Clinton administration, the United States and Europe had a privacy
dispute over the ECHELON spying program. 60 ECHELON enabled
the U.S. government to capture and data mine international
61
communications.
Similarly, in Europe, governments appear to engage in
comparable collections of international communications. More than
fifteen years ago, press reports revealed a French program parallel
to ECHELON, executed in cooperation with Germany, that captured
international communications traffic. 62 At a recent congressional
hearing, the Obama administration testified that other European
intelligence services gathered communications data and provided
that information to the United States. 63 Shortly after the testimony,
officials in the French Direction g6n6rale des services ext6rieurs
("DGSE") admitted that the DGSE massively tapped French
communications and shared captured communications with the U.S.
National Security Agency. 64 As it turns out, the British Government
Communications Headquarters ("GCHQ") has also been capturing
the international e-mail traffic of Google and Yahoo. 65 According to
the Oxford Internet Institute's Senior Research Fellow, Ian Brown,
it is likely that UK government access to private sector data without
court authorization is systemic in the United Kingdom. 66
Revelations by the British press disclosed that the GCHQ, the UK
intelligence service, is capturing all data entering or exiting the UK
67
through fiber-optic cables.

60. See, e.g., Constant Brand, Europeans Warned over Echelon Spying,
THEGUARDIAN

(May 30, 2001),

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may

/30/eu.politics.
61. Id.
62. Jean Guisnel, Les Fran~aisaussi 6coutent leurs allies [The French Also
Wiretap Their Allies], LE POINT (June 6, 1998), http://www.lepoint.fr/actualitespolitique/2007-01-25/les-francais-aussi-ecoutent-leurs-allies/917/0/91357.
63. Michael S. Schmidt, N.S.A. Head Says European Data Was Collected by
Allies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/1O/30/us
/politics/u-s-intelligence-officials-defend-surveillance-operations-on-capitolhill.html.
64. Jacques Follorou, Surveillance: la DGSE a transmi des donnees a la

NSA americaine [Surveillance: The DGSE Transmitted Data to the American
NSA], LE MONDE, Oct. 30, 2013.
65. See Charlie Savage et al., N.S.A. Said to Tap Google and Yahoo Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at B1.

66. See Ian Brown, Government Access to Private-SectorData in the United
Kingdom, 2 INT'L DATA PRIvAcY L. 230, 237-38 (2012),
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/230.full.

available at

67. See Kadhim Shubber, A Simple Guide to GCHQ's Internet Surveillance
Programme Tempora, WIRED (June 24, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news
/archive/2013-06/24/gchq-tempora-101.
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In the United States, statutory provisions provide privileged
and exceptional access by public authorities to privately held
68
communications data related to foreign intelligence gathering.
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
("FISA")69 permits the President through the Attorney General to
authorize electronic surveillance without a warrant for foreign
powers and their agents outside the United States.70 These orders
are issued on a secret basis.7 1 FISA also authorizes the government
to obtain from the FISA court an interception order for
communications within the United States when the target of the
surveillance is a foreign power, or agent of a foreign power, and the
government can show that the electronic surveillance targets
facilities used by the foreign power or agent.7 2 The government
must make a probable cause showing to the FISA court and
73
demonstrate the application of data minimization procedures.
Similarly, amendments to FISA contained in section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act permit public authorities to obtain business records
from the private sector if they are relevant to an authorized
investigation. 74 Like the section 702 FISA order, a PATRIOT Act
order, known as a "National Security Letter," is also secret and is
accompanied by a gag order prohibiting the recipient from disclosing
the existence of the National Security Letter. 75 The order can even
According to the
be issued without any judicial oversight. 76
Electronic Information Privacy Center, in the last five years the
FISA court has only rejected two access requests out of 8,591 made
77
by the government.
In Europe, like in the United States, intelligence services are
afforded privileged rights of access to data. For example, in the
United Kingdom, a secretary of state (typically the foreign secretary
or the home secretary) may order interception of communications

68. See generally, Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004) (describing FISA and its
evolution).
69. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1802
(2012).
70. 50 U.S.C. § 1802.
71. Id. § 1802(a)(3).
72. See id. § 1805(a)(2).
73. Id. §§ 1805(a)-(c).
74. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act)
§ 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2012).
76. See id. § 2709(b).
77. Claire Cain Miller, Secret Ruling Put Tech Firms in Data Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2013, at Al.
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without a court warrant; 78 the decision is entirely a ministerial
choice.
Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act,
interceptions may even be made "for the purpose of safeguarding the
79
economic well-being of the United Kingdom."
France similarly has mechanisms for the executive branch to
gather communications data without a court order.8 0 Although in
1991 France established the National Commission for the Control of
Security Interceptions (Commission nationale de contr6le des
interceptions de s6curit6), the commission only has the power to
make recommendations on the legality of interceptions and does not
have the power to block them. 8' Thus, there is no truly independent
supervision of government access for an important range of
surveillance orders. And also like the United Kingdom, security
interceptions on the order of the prime minister's office are
permitted to safeguard France's economic interests thereby
providing a very broad basis to engage in surveillance.8 2
Even liberal Sweden allows warrantless wiretapping for
intelligence purposes,8 3 as does the Netherlands.8 4 And Germany,

78. See Intelligence Services Act, 1994, c. 13, §§ 5-6 (Eng.); Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 5(1); see also 10 June 2013, PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (6th Ser.) (2013) 32 (U.K.) (statement of William Hague, Sec'y of St. for
Foreign & Commonw. Aff.), available at http://www.publications.parliament
.uk/pa/cm20l3l4/cmhansrd/cml3O6lO/debtext/130610-0001.htm
#13061011000001. See generally Ian Brown, Government Access to Private
Sector Data in the United Kingdom, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 230 (2012),
available at http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/230.full (discussing the
statutory authorizations for government access to data).
79. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 5(3).
80. See Loi 91-646 du 10 juillet, 1991 relative au secret des
correspondances 6mises par la voie des communications 6lectroniques [Law 91646 of July 10, 1991 Concerning the Confidentiality of Electronic
Communications], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA R9PUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 1991, 9167, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXTOOOO0017351
9 (allowing "security interceptions" to be ordered by the Ministry of Defense or
by the Ministry of the Interior each with the permission of the Prime Minister's
Office); see also Winston Maxwell, Systematic Government Access to Private
Sector Data in France, 4 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 4 (2014), available at
http://www.hoganlovells.com/fles/Publication/7be5f777-22cl-4bd9-bac9897dd220ba04/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6e5def8a-clbb-4816-b4179162e67cb9c5/Article%20W%2OMaxwell_20140217105006.pdf
81. Loi 91-646 art. 13-15.
82. Id. art. 3.
83. Sweden Approves Wiretapping Law, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/europe/7463333.stm (last updated June 18, 2009).
84. See II. SurveillancePolicies, PRIVACY INT'L,
https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/the-netherlands/ii-surveillancepolicies (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
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too, provides special privileges for "strategic surveillance."8 5
According to recent reports, on the order of the German prime
minister, the German intelligence agency has a direct tap into the
8 6
equipment of Internet service providers.
II. INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS
United States and European democracies have had great
difficulty grappling with the border between surveillance and
privacy. At present, the technological infrastructure breeds systems
of surveillance and the legal infrastructure embeds liberal
permissions for access. In the United States, the former chairman
of a congressional oversight committee was astonished to learn in
the first public report that law enforcement made 1.3 million
requests for user transaction data during 2011.87 Globally, in the
last three years, the Google Transparency Report shows that data
access requests by public authorities have almost doubled.8 8 United
States authorities make the overwhelming majority of these
requests, though six European countries are in the top ten.8 9 The
extraordinarily rapid growth in Europe and the United States in the
number of access requests poses a structural challenge to privacy in
democracy from three perspectives. First, data retention and access
rules cannot be divorced from one another and the standards for
linkage are elusive. Second, the apparatus for surveillance shifts
the burden and role of public enforcement to private actors as
agents. And, third, national security privilege creates a delicate
balance for oversight that requires transparency.
A.

Elusive Linkages

Delimiting privacy requires combined policy rules on both
retention and access because, if privacy is to be protected, more
developed and extensive data retention necessitates more careful

85. Paul M. Schwartz, Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector
Data in Germany, 2 INT'L DATA PRIvACY L. 289, 297 (2012), available at
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/289.full.pdf+html.
86. Cyrus Farivar, German NSA Has Deal to Tap ISPs at Major Internet
Exchange, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 7, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/10/german-nsa-has-deal-to-tap-isps-at-major-internet-exchange/.
87. Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2012, at Al.

88. Transparency Report: Requests for User Information, GOOGLE,
http:lwww.google.com/transparencyreportluserdatarequestsl(last visited Feb.
8, 2014).
89. Between January 2013 and June 2013, the top ten requestors are, in
descending order: the United States, India, Germany, France, the UK, Brazil,
Italy, Spain, Australia, and Poland. Transparency Report: Requests for User
Information: Countries, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport
/userdatarequests/countries/?t--table (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
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and restrictive access. In the United States, the parameters are
essentially set by statute, while in Europe, the constitutional-level
treatment found in the Charter and the ECHR provides a backdrop
to the statutory framework.9 0 Both systems, in effect, compel data
retention-the United States by commerce and the European Union
by law-and both continents, in effect, have accepted unclear access
rules for public authorities.
Courts in the United States, for example, have had great
trouble
deciphering
the
application
of the
Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").91 One court notably stated
that the statute was "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity."92 In practice, the largest secret docket in the United States,
according to federal magistrate judge Stephen Smith, is the ECPA
"warrant type applications" or secret electronic surveillance
orders. 93 This indicates that the statutory protections constraining
access to retained data by public authorities have an elusive
boundary.
In Europe, data protection authorities have expressed strong,
consistent objections to data retention. 94 The European Union data
protection authorities have even declared that the Data Retention
Directive "encroaches into the daily life of every citizen and may

90. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 2 (explaining the existence of a right to
respect for private and family life).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).
92. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th
Cir. 1994).
93. Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA's
Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L & POLY REV. 313, 318-22 (2012) (citing TIM REAGAN &
GEORGE CORT, FED. JUD. CTR., SEALED CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS

22 (2009),

available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfflookup/sealcafc.pdf/$file
/sealcafc.pdf).
94. See, e.g., Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2002 on the
Statement of the European Data Protection Commissioners at the International
Conference in Cardiff (9-11 September 2002) on Mandatory Systematic Retention
of Telecommunication Traffic Data, at 3 (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Opinion
5/2002], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002
/wp64-en.pdf; Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2005 on the
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the
Retention of Data Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public
Electronic Communication Services and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, at 5
(Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Opinion 4/2005], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies
/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wpll3_en.pdf; Art. 29 Data Protection Working
Party, Opinion 3/2006 on the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European
Parliamentand of the Council on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed
in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and
Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Opinion
3/2006],
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp ll9
_en.pdf.
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endanger the fundamental values and freedoms all European
citizens enjoy and cherish" 95 and have called for restrictive
implementation at the member state level. Francesca Bignami
argues that the Data Retention Directive adequately protects
privacy as the right is articulated in the ECHR.96 But, others have
argued that the directive itself fails the proportionality test. 97 There
is even an inherent flaw with respect to the distinction the Data
Retention Directive draws between content and transaction data.
Article 5(2) bans the storage of content. 98 But, the application of
data mining to traffic data can readily disclose the content of
communications, thus transforming the retained traffic data into a
vector of content data.
Throughout the adoption process of the Data Retention
Directive, the European Union data protection authorities
consistently objected to overreaching in the scope of the retention
requirements. 99 Their objections nonetheless seem to have been
minimized or ignored in the political process leading to the adoption
of the directive. The opinions of the Article 29 Working Party,
comprised of representatives from each of the national privacy
commissions, were largely disregarded in the adoption of the
directive itself and in the adoption of national implementing
legislation. In July 2010, the Article 29 Working Party went so far
as to declare that the implementation of the Data Retention
Directive was unlawful. 100 The European Court of Justice is
currently considering whether the retention obligation and duration
of storage is compatible with the Charter. 0 1

95. Opinion 3/2006, supranote 94.
96. See generally Francesca Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the
European Union: The Data Retention Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 233 (2007).
97. Lukas Feiler, The Legality of the Data Retention Directive in Light of
the FundamentalRights to Privacy and Data Protection, 1 EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1,
19 (2010), available at http://ejlt.org//article/download/29/76.
98. Data Retention Directive, supra note 25, art. 5(2).
99. Opinion 3/2006, supra note 94; Opinion 4/2005, supra note 94;
Opinion 5/2002, supra note 94.
100. See Report 01/2010 on the Second Joint Enforcement Action:
Compliance at National Level of Telecom Providers and ISPs with the
Obligations Required from National Traffic Data Retention Legislation on the
Legal Basis of Articles 6 and 9 of the e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC and the
Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC Amending the e-Privacy Directive,at 1, 10
(July 13, 2010) [hereinafter Report 01/2010], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies
/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wpl72_en.pdf. Compare Opinion 3/2006, supra note
94, at 3, with Data Retention Directive, supra note 25, at arts. 1, 4.
101. The high courts of Austria and Ireland have each referred questions on
the legality of the Data Retention Directive to the European Court of Justice.
See Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ir. v. Minister for
Commc'n, Seitlinger & Others. In the referral, the ECJ will address whether
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While not clearly articulated in the debate over data retention
obligations, the data access mechanisms heighten the concern over
the scope of the data retention requirements. Access controls
remain elusive across Europe. The member states tilt in favor of
broad public authority access and, in fact, the implementing laws for
the Data Retention Directive of two member states are now before
the European Court of Justice for potential violations of the Charter
and the ECHR.102 A few national courts have also struck down
10 3
particular implementing statutes.
The access rules are not defined in the treaty documents and
are not defined in the directives. Rather, they must be established
at the member state level based on balancing various amorphous
interests. The ECHR permits intrusions on privacy if the intrusion
is (1) authorized by law; (2) "in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime;" and (3) proportional. 104 The
European Court of Human Rights has indicated that "in accordance
with the law" requires that statutory measures spell out the access
procedures and that secret processes do not qualify.105
In
addressing law enforcement access to stored biometric data, the
European Court of Human Rights noted that
it is as essential, in this context, as in telephone tapping,
secret surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering, to have
clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of
measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, inter
alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties,
procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of
data and procedures for its destruction, thus providing
sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and
arbitrariness. 106

the directive's obligations for retention are compatible with article 8 in both the
ECHR and the Charter. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Czech ConstitutionalCourt Rejects Data Retention Legislation,
EDRI (Apr. 6, 2011), http://edri.org/edrigramnumber9-7czech-data-retentiondecision/.
104. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 8; see also Bignami, supranote 96, at 242-49.
105. See Liberty & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, 48 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1, IM 62, 66, 69 (2008).
106. S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 48
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1169,
99 (2008), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl
/standardsetting/dataprotection/Judgments/S.%20AND%20MARPER%20v.%20
THE%20UNITED%20KINGDOM%20EN.pdf.
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However, the Strasbourg court gives deference to national
authorities on the determination of a "pressing social need" as a
legitimate aim of an access law.107
With respect to proportionality, the Charter elaborates on the
requirement. 108 As explained by the European Court of Justice,
proportionality means that
measures adopted by [Union] institutions do not exceed the
limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain
the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in
question; when there is a choice between several appropriate
measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims
pursued.109

As reported by the Article 29 Working Party, however, the practices
and determinations of proportionality in data retention
requirements vary widely across the European Union, indicating a
failure of the "proportionality" standard to be an effective protection
for privacy. 110 Equally problematic is that the European Court of
'
Human Rights tends to give a "wide margin of appreciation"111
to
member state laws in the realm of public safety, but looks strictly at
infringements of fundamental rights.11 2 This suggests that the
European Court of Human Rights will face a constant struggle
between liberal acceptance of public safety regulations and strict
113
scrutiny for fundamental rights breaches.
The German example shows the difficulty in assessing
proportionality. Paul Schwartz writes that Germany distinguishes
between data mining for the investigation of past crimes and data
mining for the prevention of potential crimes. 1 4 The criminal
procedure code applies to investigatory data mining and requires
"sufficient factual indications to show that a criminal offense of
significant importance has been committed." 115 But, data mining for
crime prevention may impinge on citizens' rights to information

107. Id. 101.
108. Charter, supra note 2, art. 52(1).
109. Feiler, supra note 97, at 10 (quoting Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Mn.
of Agri., Fisheries and Food and Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte Fedesa and
Others, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4023, § 13; Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93, and C362/93, Crispoltoni and Others v. Tabacchi and Srl, 1994 E.C.R. 1-04863, § 40).
110.

Report 01/2010, supranote 100, at 1.

111. See, e.g., Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 433, 67 (1987).
112. See Manoussakis v. Greece, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 144 (1996).
113. Courts of individual member states may, however, apply more stringent
standards to public safety regulators than those contained in the ECHR.
114. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 292.
115. Id. at 292-93 (translating the German criminal procedure code section
98a).
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privacy when there is a "concrete danger to a legal interest." 116
Schwartz notes that law enforcement must show a risk of danger
before preventive data mining will be permissible under the German
constitution. 11 7 The problem with this approach is that danger is
now a fact of life in a world of global terrorism, and more
information will always be seen as a mechanism to reduce the risk
of danger.
Interestingly, the German Constitutional Court struck down the
Data Retention Directive's implementing statute because the law
did not provide sufficient clarity on purpose limitations for data
access and transparency about its use. 11 8 More recently, the
European Commission referred Germany to the European Court of
Justice for failure to implement the Data Retention Directive
following the annulment of the German statute. 19
France, as another example, enacted a statute in 2001 on public
safety, Loi sur la sdcurit6 quotidienne,120 as an emergency measure
to require the collection and retention of telecommunications traffic
data. Yet, the decree to implement the law was not adopted for five
years. 12' The delay suggests that the need for the data is neither as
urgent nor as critical as publicly stated.
B.

Burden of Enforcement
The combination of data retention in the private sector and
access to that data by public authorities shifts the burden of law
enforcement to private actors. Private actors become responsible for
the data sets that fuel law enforcement activity.
This shift
transforms private actors into the instrumentalities of privacy
intrusions. This shift also imposes some of the costs of law
22
enforcement onto private actors.
116. Id. at 293.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 293-94.

119. Press Release, European Comm'n, Commission Takes Germany. to
Court Requesting
that
Fines
Be
Imposed
(May 31,
2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-530_en.htm.
120. Loi 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 relative A la s6curit6 quotidienne
[Law 2001-1062 of Nov. 15, 2001 on Public Safety], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

[J.O.] [OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 15, 2001,

18215, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte
=JORFTEXT000000222052&dateTexte=20140209.
121. Decret 2006-358 du 24 mars 2006 relatif Ala conservation des donn~es
des communications 6lectroniques [Decree 2006-358 of Mar. 24, 2006 on the
Retention of Electronic Communications Data],

JOURNAL

OFFICIEL

DE

LA

RPPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 24, 2006,

4609,
available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte
=JORFTEXT000000637071&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id.
122. Not all costs are shifted to private actors, as Internet service providers
do charge fees for access requests.
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For Europe, the data retention requirement explicitly
transforms the private sector into agents of law enforcement. By
requiring service providers to store data in what would otherwise be
a contravention of the Data Protection Directive, the Data Retention
Directive obligates private parties to maintain a surveillance
database for law enforcement. In effect, Europe has turned online
intermediaries into sheriffs. This shift contradicts European legal
traditions such as those of France and Belgium that place the state
as the guarantor of citizen freedom. In other words, Europe has now
enlisted private sector organizations as the "protectors" of societal
rights to security and public safety.
This privatization of law enforcement has broad ramifications.
Once private sector organizations are maintaining systems for the
protection of societal rights, the scope of those rights are likely to be
subject to function creep. Colin Bennett and Charles Raab wrote of
"the tendency for new uses and applications to be found over time
unrelated to the purposes for which the technology was originally
designed.1 23 Function creep pushes uses of the data into other
spheres. For example, not surprisingly, data retention is used in
some European countries by public authorities to assist in the
enforcement of intellectual property rights-private economic rights.
The French law on the digital economy, Loi pour la confiance dans
l'conomie numgrique, requires that data be retained for use in the
prosecution of intellectual property violations.124 And the European
Court of Justice authorized the use in Sweden of data retained by
Internet service providers for intellectual property rights
enforcement. 125 Thus, the retention of data to address antisocial
crime becomes a means to enforce private economic rights,

123. COLIN BENNETT & CHARLES RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 139 (2003); see also, KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., A
REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY FOR THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER BY

(David Murakami Wood ed., 2006),
available at http://www.ico.org.uk/-/media/documents/library/Data-Protection
/Practical.applicationISURVEILLANCESOCIETYFULLREPORT_2006.PDF
("Personal data, collected and used for one purpose and to fulfill one function,
often migrate to other ones that extend and intensify surveillance and invasions
of privacy beyond what was originally understood and considered socially,
ethically and legally acceptable.").
124. Loi n' 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l'6conomie
numbrique [Law 2004-575 of June 21, 2004 on Trust in the Digital Economy],
THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK 9

JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.]

[OFFICIAL

GAZETTE

OF

June 21, 2004, art. 6, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000801164&dateTexte=&categorieLien
=id.
125. Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB and Others v. Perfect Commc'n Swed.
AB,
61 (2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document
/document.jsf?text=&docid=121743&pageIndex=O&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir
=&occ=first&part=l&cid=243715.
FRANCE],
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something unlikely to have been authorized if made as an initial
purpose of the retention and access demands.
In the United States, there is an equivalent effect. The private
sector retains extensive data sets because of the commercial
pressures and the push for Big Data. As repositories of traffic and
geolocation data, these private intermediaries become a central
resource for public enforcement actions. 126 The statistics provided
by the semiannual Google Transparency Report 127 demonstrate the
growing extent of the use by public authorities of private sector data
resources for state law enforcement activity. Like the contradiction
of legal traditions in Europe, the shift in the United States also
juxtaposes the American approach to state power. The Bill of Rights
generally enshrines the philosophy that citizens should be protected
from the State. 128 In contrast, easy access by public authorities to
privately held data for law enforcement purposes transforms
citizens into instruments of state power with respect to their fellow
citizens. This transformation is in opposition to the underlying core
values in the Bill of Rights approach. 129
C.

National Security Oversight
The privileges for national security extend to oversight and
have invariably conflicted with accountability. Public accountability
necessitates an important degree of transparency in data processing
operations.
President Obama once argued that "[g]overnment
should be transparent. Transparency promotes accountability and
provides information for citizens about what their Government is
doing."'130 The national security privileges, however, grant secrecy
to data surveillance operations. There is consequently an inherent
contradiction between the secrecy of intelligence operations and the
requisite transparency for public accountability.
The balance
between these privileges for national security and effective oversight
is unstable.
In the United States, oversight for the privileged access to data
afforded to national security operations is intrinsically weak.
126. Jack Balkin warned of this "National Surveillance State." Jack Balkin,
The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(2008).
127. Transparency
Report,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com
/transparencyreport/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
128. See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection,
Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DuKE L.J. 507, 525-27 (1991)
(discussing the emphasis on negative rights, but also a positive right
component).
129. This transformation may also mean that the state action doctrine is
satisfied when private intermediaries are used as law enforcement agents.
130. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg.
4685, 4685 (Jan.26, 2009).
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Government access requests are secret. 131 When a FISA court order
is required, the evidence is secret 132 and, as reported by the Chief
Most of the
Judge, often withheld from the court itself.13 3
3 4 Finally, the
nonadversarial.
thus
and
ex
parte
are
proceedings
decisions of the court are secret and can be released by the court
only in a government-redacted form. 135 This structure of secrecy
impedes effective oversight.
The lack of transparency goes even deeper and challenges the
capacity for public accountability. In the United States, the Chief
Judge of the FISA Court surprisingly admitted that "[t]he FISC is
forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that is provided
to the Court." 136 In other words, unauthorized and illegal activity
will only be brought to the court's attention by a guilty intelligence
But, rather than present accurate information, the
service.
intelligence community appears to have a pattern of deceiving the
The Director of National
secrecy-shrouded oversight bodies.
that the NSA was not
Congress
before
testified
even
Intelligence
137 The testimony turned
of
Americans.
millions
on
data
collecting
out be false. 138 More recently, General Keith Alexander, the
Director of the National Security Agency, testified to Congress that
the number of plots (fifty-four) reported by the government to

131.
132.

50 U.S.C. § 1803(c) (2012); id. § 1861(d).
Id. § 1803(c).

133. Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying ProgramLimited,
WASH. POST. (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-

ability-to-police-us-spying-program-limited2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd- 1 le3a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html.
134. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a), 1824(a), 1842(d)(1), 1861(c)(1).
135. See U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE CT. R. P. 62. Summary
statistics of the number of requests considered are, though, publicly reported to
Congress. 50 U.S.C. §1807; id at § 1862(b).
136. Leonnig, supra note 133.

137. Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 113th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 66 (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov

/131113pdfs/1389.pdf (testimony of NSA Director Clapper stating that the
NSA does not collect data on millions of Americans).
138. Letter from James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, to Senator Ron
Woden (Mar. 28, 2014), available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1 lOO339/letter-to-sen-ron-wyden-fromdni-james-clapper.pdf; see Barton Gelman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Maps
Targets by Their Phones, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2013, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlworld/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphonelocations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-1 1e3bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html (reporting that tens of millions of Americans are
tracked abroad); James Risen and Laura Poitras, NSA Examines Social
Networks of US Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at Al, available at
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-uscitizens.html.
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Congress as thwarted because of the intelligence data-mining
programs, was not accurate and was significantly overstated. 139
In Europe, the same conflict occurs. For example, the United
Kingdom's Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act provides that
data-gathering orders are secret. 140 Moreover, public authorities
face little independent supervision when they engage in foreign data
sharing arrangements that circumvent restrictions on domestic data
gathering.1 4 1 For example, the U.K. foreign secretary was asked
explicitly in Parliament whether British intelligence services
obtained information on U.K. residents from foreign intelligence
services without the specific ministerial order that would be
required for domestic surveillance. 142 The minister evasively
responded:
On the right hon. Gentleman's further questions about how
authority is given, I cannot give him, for reasons that I cannot
explain in public, as detailed an answer as he would like. I
would love to give him what could actually be a very helpful
answer, but because circumstances and procedures vary
according to the situation, I do not want to give a categorical
answer-in a small respect circumstances might differ
occasionally. But I can say that ministerial oversight and
independent scrutiny is there, and there is scrutiny of the ISC
in all these situations, so, again, the idea that operations are
carried out without ministerial oversight, somehow getting
around UK law, is mistaken. I am afraid that I cannot be
more specific than that.143

The obfuscation by the minister in his answer strongly indicates
that information-sharing arrangements with foreign intelligence
services circumvent at least some of the safeguards protecting
privacy from domestic surveillance.

139. Hearingon Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act: Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 2,
2013),
http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?comm=judiciary&type=live&filename
=judiciary100213 (testimony of the Hon. Keith Alexander, Director of the NSA
in response to a question from Senator Leahy beginning at 52:35).
140. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, §§ 49, 54 (U.K.).
141. The United States government has publicly acknowledged the existence
of such sharing arrangements. See Schmidt, supra note 63.
142. 10 June 2013, PARL DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2013) 36 (U.K.) (statement of
William Hague, Sec'y of St. for Foreign & Commonw. Aff.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20l314/cmhansrd/cml30610/debte
xt/130610-0001.htm#13061011000001.
143. Id. at 37.

2014]

THE DATA SURVEILLANCE STATE
III. THE PRiVACY TURNING POINT

The existence of retained traffic data, the reliance on uncertain
access rules, the recourse to an elusive proportionality, the
dependence on private actors, and the privileges accorded to
national security collectively place privacy and values in democracy
at a turning point. In the aggregate, these elements increase the
transparency of citizens' online lives and reduce the sphere of
privacy that citizens can enjoy. This transparency is destructive of
many fundamental democratic values.
First, the transparency reverses the presumption of innocence.
The presumption is central to the philosophy underlying the
warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment and the principle
that citizens are innocent until proven guilty in the Fifth and
In Europe, the presumption of
Fourteenth Amendments.14 4
innocence is also a fundamental tenent of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: "Everyone who has
been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law."145

Yet, data that are collected and retained

without any individualized cause or suspicion by private actors for
subsequent access by public authorities contravenes the basic
constitutional philosophies. If law generally requires collection and
retention, the rationale is that all individuals in the data set are
suspect. Similarly, if broad access is afforded to data sets that were
created for commercial purposes, the core philosophy is that all
individuals in the data set are suspect. These practices transform
the presumption of innocence into a presumption of suspicion
counter to the core constitutional philosophies.
Second, the forced transparency diffuses the monopoly of the
state on law enforcement. Law enforcement, investigation, and
intelligence activities are blurred when communications service
providers must retain and make available client and user data.
Function creep assures that this diffusion of resources for law
enforcement to the private sector will lead to increasing demands
and an expansion of the scope of enforcement activity to encompass
private matters and not just public safety and security.
Third, the transparency from private data mining and publicly
mandated surveillance (i.e., forced data retention) diminishes the
zone of individual freedom. Where data retention is neither sharply
limited nor combined with strong, clear access controls, the ability of
citizens to make decisions about their personal information and

144. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National
Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1459, 1466-67 (2004); Ira S. Rubinstein et al.,
Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological
Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 263 (2008).
145. Charter, supra note 2, art. 48.
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their ability to decide when and how to disclose their thoughts,
146
beliefs, and activities, are impaired.
Finally, the transparency of personal information through the
national security exceptions assures troubling intelligence gathering
from inevitable overreaching.
Without a means for effective
oversight, the privileges afforded to intelligence operations blur
government information gathering into generic, ambient state
surveillance. 147 Nondemocratic regimes strive for this level of
knowledge of their citizenry's activities.
IV. SECURING PRIVACY
At this turning point, societies need to better secure privacy
than the existing framework allows. Substantive and procedural
changes are necessary for the preservation of democratic values.
And, accountability needs to be effective.
On the substantive side, stringent collection and storage
limitations, as well as robust obstacles to state access, are all
necessary conditions to online privacy. The existing demarcation
lines are too unstable.
Without clear, inviolable, red line
boundaries, the resulting transparency of citizens' activities creates
a powerful generic surveillance environment that undermines the
policy objectives justifying access to extensive data trails in the first
place: the investigation of crime and the protection of public safety
and liberty. In short, the coupling of strict retention limitations and
clear, firm access controls are essential for the future of citizens'
online privacy. Red line boundaries should include (1) retention
limits that, without a compelling justification specific to a target, do
not go beyond a duration required for billing; (2) a ban on access
without independent, public judicial oversight; and (3) no cross
sharing between intelligence and law enforcement or between law
enforcement and economic rights enforcement. These boundaries
will need to be established in both national law and international
agreements. International agreements are necessary because of the
146. Neil Richards refers to this freedom as "intellectual privacy." Neil M.
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387 (2008).
147. For example, in the United States, the personal information gathered
through intelligence exceptions was used by the government for routine
criminal investigations. See Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy
Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-citewarrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html?hpw&_r=0 (disclosing the use of data
collected under intelligence authority for ordinary criminal cases as a result of
earlier news reports); John Schiffman & Kristina Cooke, U.S. Directs Agents to
Cover Up Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sodidUSBRE97409R20130805 (describing the information-sharing program
between the NSA and the Drug Enforcement Agency).

20141

THE DATA SURVEILLANCE STATE

global complexity of data flows along with the inherent and
fundamental political choices associated with surveillance. National
laws are necessary to constrain the domestic actors who are
responsible for data surveillance activities.
In parallel to the substantive coupling of retention limits with
strong access controls, new procedural obligations are needed to
First, the
secure online privacy from state interference.
infrastructure of collection and access to personal information must
Furnishers of personal information to law
be transparent.
enforcement should be obligated to keep a log of law enforcement
access requests and to make that log available to clients whose
information was accessed. For law enforcement, data transparency
logs should be obligatory and available to those whose information is
processed. 148 In the United States, there is a precedent for such
logs. The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires that anyone furnishing
a consumer report keep a log of recipients of the consumer report
and provide the identity of those recipients to the consumer upon
request. 149 This procedure creates a means of oversight for affected
consumers that would apply equally, if not more significantly, to the
law enforcement context. In the law enforcement context, the risk of
surveillance overreaching is no less important than abusive
disclosures of credit report information.
For the intelligence-gathering context, there must similarly be
transparency of data access for public security unless transparency
The
presents a clear and present danger to public safety.
safety
public
determination of whether there is a clear and present
threat needs to be made by an authority that is independent of the
executive branch. The executive branch should not be in control of
the dissemination of access orders. The incentive for selective
disclosure to distort the public's understanding of government
behavior is too great if the executive branch controls disclosure of its
150
activities.
Lastly, democratic societies need true accountability for law
Individuals who
enforcement and national security conduct.
overreach their authority must face penalties. Current laws often

148. This parallels a proposal made by Judge Smith for public docket sheets
in the context of secret electronic surveillance orders under ECPA. See Smith,
supra note 93, at 335.

149. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3) (2012).
150. In the recent U.S. context, only a small number of FISA court orders
have been released and they have been released only in a form heavily redacted
by the U.S. government. See, e.g., In re: Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 (FISA Ct.
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fiscrO82208.pdf.
2008),
Because this is such a highly selective disclosure, the public does not know the
true nature of the FISA court's activities and decisions.
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do the opposite and give immunity, even retroactively, for data
access violations. 151 When a senior government officer admits to
deceiving a public oversight body, the failure to sanction the
individual sends a powerful message of tolerance for wrongful
intrusions into ordinary people's lives and abusive state action.
Both legal immunity and expedient tolerance need to be reversed.
Unless democratic societies act quickly to rebalance data
surveillance by states, those societies will lose a fundamental
characteristic of democracy-the protection of a key individual
liberty against the absolute control of the State.

151. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act
of 2008, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2012) (allowing the Attorney General to make
a certification granting immunity); Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act,
2000, § 27(2) (U.K.) (providing immunity from civil liability); Loi 91-646 du 10
juillet, 1991 relative au secret des correspondances 6mises par la voie des
communications 6lectroniques [Law 91-646 of July 10, 1991, on the
Confidentiality of Electronic Communications], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 1991, art.
15,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid
=81BB97D75A13C3D40B5E2596DBCD17DA.tpdjol6v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT
000000173519&categorieLien=id (providing only for a recommendation to the
Prime Minister without a cause of action).

